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CITIZENS UNITED AND TAXABLE ENTITIES:
WILL TAXABLE ENTITIES BE THE NEW
STEALTH DARK MONEY CAMPAIGN
ORGANIZATIONS?
Donald B. Tobin∗
I. INTRODUCTION
The electoral process in the United States is going through a major
transition as money increasingly pours into non-candidate independent
groups (“IGs”). The Center for Responsive Politics estimates that over
$300 million flowed into IGs involved in elections in the 2012 election
cycle.1 Before 2000, IGs could engage in significant electoral advocacy
without having to disclose the IG’s donors or its expenditures.2 In 2000,
Congress sought to address the lack of disclosure by requiring political
organizations to disclose their contributions and expenditures.3 IGs
quickly sought an alternative organizational form for engaging in
political advocacy. For the most part, the organizational form of choice
∗

Dean and Professor of Law, University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law.
This Lecture is an update of a previous Article, written in 2007, on taxable entities and
campaign finance. Donald B. Tobin, Political Advocacy and Taxable Entities: Are They the
Next “Loophole”?, 6 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 41 (2007). In light of the Supreme Court’s decision
in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, a brief update was warranted. 558 U.S. 310,
372 (2010). The author wishes to thank David Herzig, Brian Hellwig, Gregg Polsky, Ellen
Aprill, Brian Galle, the Valparaiso Law Review, and the participants in the South East
Association of Law School’s tax discussion group.
1
Total Outside Spending by Election Cycle, Excluding Party Committees, OPENSECRETS.ORG,
https://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/cycle_tots.php (last visited Mar. 23, 2015),
archived at http://perma.cc/M6YV-V3AC.
2
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 79–80 (1976) (per curium). Before 2001, IGs that were not
classified as political action committees were only required to disclose if they engaged in
“express advocacy.” In Buckley v. Valeo, the Court limited several provisions contained in
the Federal Election Campaign Act (“FECA”). Id. The Court determined that only
communication that expressly advocated the election or defeat of a candidate would be
subject to regulation. Id. In many cases, Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”)
regulations required groups to disclose that they purchased a particular advertisement. See
47 C.F.R. § 73.1212 (2013) (showing regulations for radio advertisements); 47 C.F.R.
§ 76.1715 (2013) (showing regulations for television advertisements); 47 U.S.C. § 317(a)(1)
(2012) (illustrating the requirements for types of sponsorship information). These
disclosures, however, usually only required the name of the organizations, which could be
created specifically for the purpose of the advertisement. See Daniel L. Simmons, An Essay
on Federal Income Taxation and Campaign Finance Reform, 54 FLA. L. REV. 1, 4 (2002)
(providing discussion on pre-2000 law of disclosure and IGs); Donald B. Tobin, Anonymous
Speech and Section 527 of the Internal Revenue Code, 37 GA. L. REV. 611, 612–13 (2003)
(continuing discussion on the provisions requiring disclosure of campaign contributions or
expenditures) [hereinafter Anonymous Speech and Section 527].
3
Pub. L. No. 106-230, 114 Stat. 477 (2000).
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has been designated as a social welfare organization under section
501(c)(4) of the Code.4
Section 501(c)(4) organizations, however, are not supposed to be
campaign organizations.5 They are allowed to engage in some political
activity, but the groups’ primary purpose must be social welfare
activity.6 If Congress or the Internal Revenue Service (“Service") clamps
down on recent abuses, section 501(c)(4) status may be an imperfect
alternative form for avoiding section 527’s disclosure provisions.7
Moreover, recent proposed regulations by the Treasury, seeking to create
clear rules for social welfare organizations, might limit the attractiveness
of social welfare organizations and campaign vehicles.8 If social welfare
organizations become less attractive entities, IGs may look to taxable
organizations, which have significantly less regulation, as alternative
campaign vehicles.
In a 2007 article, I explored whether tax-exempt entities would be the
next loophole used by IGs to avoid disclosure of contributions and
expenditures.9 I concluded that in most cases taxable entities would not
be an attractive vehicle because there would be significant tax
implications if an entity forwent tax-exempt status, and because taxable
corporations were prohibited from expressly advocating the election or
defeat of a candidate.10 The Supreme Court, however, overturned the
ban on independent corporate spending in Citizens United v. Federal
Election Commission.11 Post Citizens United, taxable entities are now a far
more attractive vehicle for campaign activity than they were in 2007.
Social welfare organizations and other tax-exempt entities are now
subject to increased scrutiny. There have been calls for increased
Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(4)-1(a)(2)(i) (2013).
Id. at § 1.501(c)(4)-1(a)(2)(ii).
6
Id.
7
Short term, it does not appear that either Congress, the Treasury, or the Service will
provide for further regulation of social welfare organizations. The Treasury recently
proposed further rulemaking. Guidance for Tax-Exempt Social Welfare Organizations on
Candidate-Related Political Activities, 78 Fed. Reg. 71535 (proposed Nov. 29, 2013). After
receiving over 150,000 comments, the Service noted that it would likely make revisions to
the proposed rule and seek further comment. IRS Update on the Proposed New-Regulation on
501(c)(4) Organizations, IRS.GOV (May 22, 2014), http://www.irs.gov/uac/Newsroom/IRSUpdate-on-the-Proposed-New-Regulation-on-501(c)(4)-Organizations,
archived
at
http://perma.cc/KG7C-J6NR?type=source.
8
See 78 Fed. Reg. 71535 (expressing the guidelines of contributions from section 501(c)
organizations); supra notes 5–6 and accompanying text (discussing the creation of clear
orders for social welfare organizations).
9
Donald B. Tobin, Political Advocacy and Taxable Entities: Are They the Next “Loophole”?,
6 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 41, 42 (2007) [hereinafter Political Advocacy and Taxable Entities].
10
Id. at 99.
11
558 U.S. 310, 372 (2009).
4
5
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enforcement of the existing rules regulating tax-exempt organizations
involved in election related activities.12 In the campaign finance arena,
further regulation in one area often entices entities to conduct activities
in another. As Congress and the Service consider further regulation of
social welfare groups, they must also consider whether further
regulation of tax-exempt organizations will encourage IGs to reorganize
as taxable organizations. This Lecture discusses whether taxable entities
will be attractive vehicles for IGs interested in avoiding broad based
disclosure.
Since taxable entities are subject to less regulation, they will be
attractive vehicles as long as the tax consequences to the IGs do not
outweigh the economic and regulatory benefits of forgoing tax-exempt
status. The key question is a tax question, not an election law question:
can taxable entities engage in campaign activity without incurring
significant tax liability?
II. CURRENT REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
Currently, most IGs organize as tax-exempt organizations under
either section 501(c) or section 527 of the Code.13 Section 527 was
specifically created as the organizational structure for political
organizations.14 Section 527 organizations are tax-exempt, donors to
section 527 organizations are not subject to the gift tax, contributions to
the organization are not tax deductible, and the organization must
disclose its donors and its expenditures.15 Section 501(c)(3) charitable
organizations are exempt from tax, they are prohibited from intervening
in a political campaign for or against a candidate for public office, and
contributions to the organization are tax deductible.16 Other 501(c)
organizations operate in the space between these two organizations. For
the most part, these organizations are not subject to tax on income
related to the organizations’ purpose and are not subject to public
disclosure obligations with regard to contributions to organizations or
12
See supra note 7 and accompanying text (discussing tax-exempt organizations’
permissible involvement in election activities).
13
See generally I.R.C. § 501(c) (2012) (detailing the list of exempt organizations); id.
§ 527(a) (2012) (defining political organization).
14
See Pub. L. No. 93-625, § 10(a), 88 Stat. 2108 (1975) (amending Section 527 of the
Internal Revenue Code and providing a specific tax exempt category for Political
Organizations in 1975).
15
See I.R.C. §§ 527(c)(3), (f)(1) (2012) (exempting contributions to political organizations
from gift tax); id. § 2501(a)(4) (exempting transfers of money or other personal property to
political organizations from gift tax).
16
See id. §§ 170(a)(1), (b)(A)(vi) (explaining the allowance of deductions for charitable
contributions and gifts); id. § 501(c)(3) (explaining the exemption from tax).
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expenditures of organizations.17 Tax-exempt organizations that are not
organized under section 527, however, must have a primary purpose
that does not involve intervening in candidate elections.18
In previous work, I have argued that the section 527 disclosure
provisions apply to all organizations, including taxable ones that have as
their primary purpose the election or defeat of a candidate for public
office.19 To date, however, there have been no cases considering the
reach of section 527s disclosure provisions.20 Moreover, in light of the
Service’s reluctance to aggressively enforce existing provisions, it is
questionable whether taxable entities will be subject to section 527’s
disclosure provisions even if the organizations have as their primary
purpose engaging in election advocacy.21
If section 527 does not apply to taxable entities, or taxable entities
avoid engaging in electoral advocacy on behalf of a candidate as their
primary purpose, a taxable entity could engage in non-coordinated
electoral advocacy without having to disclose contributions to the
organization or expenditures of the organization. To the extent the
organization engaged in electioneering communication or express
advocacy, the entity might be subject to regulation under FECA, but
even in those instances the organization would likely not be subject to
donor disclosure.22
Thus, absent tax consequences, taxable entities allow organizations
to avoid serious disclosure. Moreover, taxable entities are also not

17
See id. § 501(c)(4)(A) (discussing social welfare organizations); id. § 501(c)(5)
(composing the wording for labor unions); I.R.C. § 501(c)(6) (providing language for
business leagues). These organizations are still subject to disclosure under FECA, but these
organizations can very easily avoid donor disclosure under election law. Donald Tobin,
Campaign Disclosure and Tax-Exempt Entities: A Quick Repair to the Regulatory Plumbing, 10
ELECTION L. J. 427, 427 (2011) (stating that many IGs have figured out how to manipulate
the tax classification).
18
Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(4)-1(a)(2)(ii) (2013).
19
See Anonymous Speech and Section 527, supra note 2, at 619 (establishing that section 527
does not apply to all political organizations).
20
See I.R.C. § 527(j)(2) (2012) (explaining required disclosures of expenditures and
contributions).
21
See id. § 527(a) (stating a political organization is subject to tax, and although the
primary purpose test requires express advocacy, IRC section 527 does not).
22
See Electioneering Communication, 72 Fed. Reg. 72899, 72911 (Dec. 26, 2007) (codified
at 11 CFR Part 104, 114) (analyzing electioneering communications). The FEC has
determined that donations to a social welfare organization only need to be disclosed if the
donation was made for the purpose of electioneering communication. Id. Donors can
avoid disclosure easily by not designating the payment for a specific communication. Id.
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subject to initial review by the Service nor are they subject to public
disclosure of their tax returns.23
III. TAX LIABILITY
If tax-exempt entities are subject to robust disclosure provisions and
taxable entities are not, taxable entities may become very attractive
vehicles for IGs seeking to engage in election advocacy without being
subject to a disclosure regime. In the past, the two main hurdles for
using taxable entities were: (1) the ban on corporate spending on
electioneering activity; and (2) the fear that there would be significant tax
consequences if an entity organized as a taxable organization.24
In theory, a taxable organization engaged in campaign advocacy
would have little to no income. A taxable campaign organization would
not make a profit and its business deductions would offset any income
the organization received.
For example, if contributions to the
organization were considered income, that income would be offset by
deductions the organization would claim for advertising and wages.
The costs of advocacy would generally be similar to the contributions
received and the organization, therefore, would have no net income.
Congress, however, has sought to equalize the tax treatment
associated with electioneering activity. When citizens participate in the
electoral process by making contributions, they do so out of post-tax
dollars.25 Political contributions are not tax deductible.26 Congress
sought to ensure a similar treatment for taxable entities, and taxable
entities are therefore prohibited from deducting political expenditures as
business expenses.27 Thus, if contributions to a taxable IG are considered
income, the taxable IG will incur significant tax liability. If, however, the
contributions are not considered income, the taxable IG will have no
taxable income and therefore no tax liability.

23
See I.R.C. § 6033(a)(1) (2012) (providing tax-exempt entities are required to file Form
990 information returns, which are available to the public); Treas. Reg. §§ 1.6033-2(a)(1),
(a)(2)(i) (2014) (providing every organization exempt from taxation under section 501(a)
shall file an annual information return).
24
See Political Advocacy and Taxable Entities, supra note 9, at 99 (establishing the hurdles
for using taxable entities).
25
See id. at 76 (referring to the post-tax dollar payments that individuals make to
political organizations).
26
See I.R.C. § 162(e)(1) (2012) (outlining instances when a deduction is not allowed).
27
Id. § 162(e)(4)(A) (prohibiting deductions for political expenditures, and defining
influencing legislation as “any attempt to influence any legislation through communication
with any member or employee of a legislative body, or with any government official or
employee who may participate in the formulation of legislation”).
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In my 2007 Article, I reviewed the history of the taxation of political
organizations and traced the theoretical basis for determining whether
contributions to political organizations are subject to tax.28 There are
several tax theories, including a conduit theory, a capital contribution
theory, and a gift theory “that could potentially be used to argue that
payments received by taxable IGs should not constitute [gross] income to
the organizations.”29 In my previous work, I rejected the conduit theory
as being applicable here but determined that the capital contribution
theory, while very questionable, might provide the basis for exclusion.30
I ultimately concluded that these payments are best classified as gifts to
the IG.31 As gifts, the payments would not be taxable to the IG, but in
most cases, the gifts would be subject to gift tax.32 Legal and political
developments since 2007 raise the specter that taxable entities could
avoid tax by arguing that payments are contributions to capital. While
less likely, taxable entities might even be able to argue that the payments
are not income because they are gifts, but are also not subject to gift tax.
A. Conduit Theory
Under the conduit theory, “payments to IGs are not considered
income because the organizations are merely acting as conduits for
spending that a [contributor] could have made by herself.”33 In some
cases, the Service appears to use a pooling rationale when applying the
conduit theory and in others a trust rationale.34 In both situations, the
basic idea is that the contribution is not income because the organization
acts as merely an aggregator of the individual payments.35
Professors Gregg Polsky and Guy-Uriel E. Charles rely on the
pooling theory to argue that contributions to political organizations
should not be considered income to the organization.36 They note that
there would be no tax implications if neighbors joined together to build a
fence because it would simply be a pooling of funds.37 They argue that
28
See Political Advocacy and Taxable Entities, supra note 9, at 44–45 (discussing taxation of
political organizations and the theories of whether contributions are taxable).
29
Id. at 75.
30
See id. at 79 (rejecting the conduit theory).
31
See id. at 98 (concluding that contributions to IGs will be treated as gifts).
32
See I.R.C. § 102(a) (2012) (stating gross income does not include gifts).
33
See Political Advocacy and Taxable Entities, supra note 9, at 75–76 (explaining the conduit
theory).
34
See id. at 80–81 (exhibiting the pooling rationale and trust rationale of the conduit
theory).
35
See Gregg D. Polsky & Guy-Uriel E. Charles, Regulating Section 527 Organizations, 73
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1000, 1015–16 (2005) (explaining why contribution is not income).
36
Id. at 1016.
37
Id.
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neighbors joining together to support a political cause should not be
treated differently.38 If the Polsky-Charles rationale was applied to
contributions to taxable organizations, then the organization’s
contributions would not be subject to tax.39
I am skeptical of the pooling rationale because the theory applies
when the joint activity is taking the place of what an individual could do
on her own if she joined together with others. In the fence example, the
entity is created to pool money and paint the fence.40 The entity only
serves to aggregate the payments.41 The project itself is controlled by the
individual members of the community. In the fence example used by
Professors Polsky and Charles, the entity itself is just created to pool the
money.42 The neighbors have decided upon the project, and the person
or persons who control the entity serve only an administrative
function.43 The organization itself had no real function but to act as a
conduit for the contributors.44 Campaign entities are not simply
conduits for contributors. The entity, through its management, makes
significant decisions regarding the organization’s direction.
For
example, the entity’s management might decide the content of
advertisements, the strategy of a campaign, the amounts spent on
various candidates, and even which candidates are worthy of support.
The pooling theory, however, may provide a rationale to aggressive
organizations seeking to organize as taxable political campaign entities.
If the pooling theory applies, the organization would not be required to
include contributions to the organization as income under general
income tax principles.
B. Capital Contribution Theory
A second possibility for excluding contributions from taxable income
would be to structure the contributions to the entity as contributions to

Id.
Id. (explaining Professors Polsky and Charles’s rationale). Proponents of the pooling
theory also note that the Service does not tax social clubs because of the conduit theory.
The Joint Committee indicated that “the organization merely facilitates a joint activity of its
members.” STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 109TH CONG., REP. ON HISTORICAL
DEVELOPMENT AND PRESENT LAW OF THE FEDERAL TAX EXEMPTION FOR CHARITIES AND
OTHER TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS 28 (2005) (referencing S. Rep. No. 91-522, at 71 (1969)),
available at http://www.jct.gov/x-29-05.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/NT5J-WUEG.
40
See Polsky, supra note 35, at 1016 (explaining the fence example).
41
See id. (describing the aggregation of funds in the fence example).
42
See id. (showing that the entity is merely created to pool funds).
43
See id. (reiterating Professors Polsky and Charles’s fence scenario).
44
See id. (discussing pooling and the conduit theory).
38
39
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capital.45 In most cases, contributions to capital are not considered
income to the recipient organization.46 In my previous work, I outlined
the difficulties with treating the contributions as contributions to
capital.47 To be considered a contribution to capital, either the
contributor would have to receive something real in exchange for the
contribution, or the contribution would have to qualify as a nonshareholder contribution to capital.48
Treating contributions to the taxable entity as contributions to capital
likely provides the best opportunity for taxable entities to avoid tax
liability on the contribution. The idea is that the contributor would
receive some type of ownership interest in the taxable entity in exchange
for the contribution. For example, suppose a group of wealthy
individuals want to form an IG to engage in political advocacy. The IG
provides that for $1,000,000, a contributor will receive a percentage
ownership in the IG. The contributor might also receive voting rights
and some type of dissolution rights. The $1,000,000 would then possibly
be treated as a contribution to capital and the contribution could remain
anonymous.49
Section 118 also provides some opportunities for non-shareholder
contributions to capital.50 The regulation implies that this is a very
limited exclusion.51 Before passage of section 118, the Court has set out a
45
See Political Advocacy and Taxable Entities, supra note 9, at 81 (explaining the capital
contribution theory).
46
Id.
47
See id. at 82 (outlining the five part test used for contributions to capital).
48
See I.R.C. § 118(a) (2012) (“In the case of a corporation, gross income does not include
any contribution to the capital of the taxpayer.”); Treas. Reg. § 1.118-1 (2014) (explaining
the general rules and requirements for contributions to the capital of a corporation).
49
Lots of issues are raised by the use of the contribution to capital theory and they are
outside the scope of this Lecture. For example, would this be considered a private
offering? Would the advertisements be subject to securities regulations? Could the
organization limit this problem by limiting the number of investors and then joining with
other corporations to engage in the activity?
50
Treas. Reg. § 1.118-1 (2014).
51
See id. (quoting language from the regulation). § 1.118-1 reads:
Section 118 also applies to contributions to capital made by persons
other than shareholders. For example, the exclusion applies to the
value of land or other property contributed to a corporation by a
governmental unit or by a civic group for the purpose of inducing the
corporation to locate its business in a particular community, or for the
purpose of enabling the corporation to expand its operating facilities.
However, the exclusion does not apply to any money or property
transferred to the corporation in consideration for goods or services
rendered, or to subsidies paid for the purpose of inducing the taxpayer
to limit production.
Id.
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five-part test for determining whether a payment by a non-shareholder is
a contribution to capital: (1) the payment must be a permanent part of
the working capital structure; (2) it must not be compensation; (3) it must
be bargained for; (4) it must result in a “benefit to the transferee in an
amount commensurate with its value”; and (5) the asset will ordinarily
contribute to the production of additional income.52
This test has not been applied in a situation similar to that here and it
is difficult to determine exactly how a non-shareholder contribution
would be treated. It is likely, however, that a payment to an IG would
fail this test. These payments are not a permanent part of an
organization’s working capital. The payments may even be classified as
a payment for services since the IG may be deemed to perform a service
for the payment. The payments also do not contribute to the production
of income for the organization. The non-shareholder contribution to
capital also is vulnerable to a sham transaction analysis by the Service.53
Another theory that has been mentioned previously is the gift theory,
which would make contributions to the entity considered a gift and
therefore the IG would not have to include the contribution in income.54
C. Gift Theory
If contributions to the taxable entity are considered a gift, the taxable
entity will not have to include the contribution in income.55 While
taxable entities are not usually thought of as the recipient of gifts, there is
nothing in section 102 that prohibits a taxable entity from receiving a
gift.56 If the contribution is considered a gift, there is a separate issue
whether the contributor would be subject to gift tax on the contribution.

52
Political Advocacy and Taxable Entities, supra note 9, at 82. This test is principally
employed when government or nonprofit entities make contributions to a corporation’s
capital. See United States v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co., 412 U.S. 401, 413–14
(1973) (explaining when assets are considered contributions to capital); JACOB MERTENS, JR.,
THE LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 38–29 (2006) (discussing when government or
nonprofit entities make contributions to a corporation’s capital).
53
A sham transaction is “[a]n agreement or exchange that has no independent economic
benefit or business purpose and is entered into solely to create a tax advantage (such as a
deduction for a business loss). The Internal Revenue Service is entitled to ignore the
purported tax benefits of a sham transaction.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1585 (10th ed.
2014).
54
See infra Part III.C (introducing gift theory).
55
I.R.C. § 102(a) (2012).
56
See generally id. § 102 (explaining gifts and inheritances).
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There are two different tests for determining whether a contribution
is a gift for income tax and for gift tax purposes.57 The contribution to
the taxable entity will be considered a gift if it is made with detached
and disinterested generosity.58 A donor will be subject to gift tax if it is
made for money or money’s worth.59 Therefore, although it does not
really make sense in this context, it is possible for a contribution to be
considered a gift for income tax purposes and not for gift tax purposes.
If the contribution is considered a gift for both income and gift tax
purposes, the donor will likely be subject to gift tax on the contribution.
Contributions to taxable organizations appear to be gifts under the
standard definition. The contributions are made to further the general
ideals of the organization, in a way that is similar to when a donor makes
a contribution to a charity.60 The donor in the charitable context gets
some type of intangible benefit, but the Service has usually found these
types of intangible benefits insufficient to defeat a contribution to a
charity.61 If the contributions are gifts under section 102 of the Code, the
recipient organization does not have to include the gift in income.62
Payments to taxable organizations, however, may not be considered
gifts if the courts determine that the contributor has received something
of value in exchange for the payment.63 For example, in Stern v. United
States, a wealthy investor made large contributions to an organization
that was fighting political corruption in Louisiana.64 Stern believed the

57
See Comm’r v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 285–86 (1960) (outlining the test regarding
“disinterested generosity”); see also Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-8 (2013) (outlining the value of
property test).
58
See Duberstein, 363 U.S. at 285–86 (illustrating one of the tests for contribution to a
taxable entity through disinterested generosity).
59
See I.R.C. § 2512(b) (2012) (providing that a gift is made when property is transferred
for less than adequate consideration in money or money’s worth); Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-8
(2013) (determining that there is a gift when the “value of property transferred by the
donor exceeds the value in money or money’s worth of the consideration given”).
60
See I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 6812121000A (Dec. 12, 1968) (“[t]o illustrate, when an
exempt organization like the Cancer Fund receives a voluntary contribution . . . the Service
would not argue that this contribution was anything but a voluntary payment of
something for nothing . . . ”); see also Treas. Reg. § 53.4941(d)-2(f)(2) (2014) (stating that
naming rights are only an incidental or tenuous benefit for purposes of determining selfdealing in the private foundation context); Rev. Rul. 68-432, 1968-2 C.B. 105 (1968) (“[s]uch
privileges as being associated with or being known as a benefactor of the organization are
not significant return benefits that have a monetary value”).
61
See supra note 60 and accompanying text (exhibiting that the Service generally finds
intangible benefits insufficient to defeat a charitable contribution).
62
See I.R.C. § 102 (2012) (explaining the general rule for gifts).
63
See Hernandez v. Comm’r, 490 U.S. 680, 696 (1989) (outlining what may be considered
a gift and potential consequences for charitable organizations).
64
436 F.2d 1327, 1328 (5th Cir. 1971).

http://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol49/iss2/12

Tobin: Citizens United and Taxable Entities: Will Taxable Entities Be t

2015]

Citizens United and Taxable Entities

593

corruption in Louisiana was hurting the business climate.65 The Service
contended that the payments were gifts because Stern received nothing
of value in exchange for the contribution.66 The court sided with Stern,
finding the expenditures were ordinary and necessary business expenses
lacking donative intent, and were designed to protect Stern’s business
interests.67 This holding saved Stern from gift tax, but it might have
subjected the receiving organization to tax, if it were not tax exempt.68
Although the test in the gift tax and income tax context are different,
receipt of a tangible benefit defeats gift tax treatment in the income tax
context because the payment is then not given with detached and
disinterested generosity.69
The next question is whether the gift is subject to gift tax. Gift tax is
generally owed on transfers that were not made for “money or money’s
worth”70 There is a yearly gift tax exemption amount, now set at
$14,000.71 It is highly questionable, however, whether this exemption
amount would apply to donations to taxable corporations.72
The Service’s position with regard to gift treatment in situations like
this is no longer clear. The Services’s position was that these types of
contributions were gifts for both gift tax and income tax purposes, but it
may be backing away from this treatment.73 Treating contributions to an

Id.
Id. at 1329.
67
Id. at 1328–29.
68
Id. at 1330.
69
See Hernandez v. Comm’r, 490 U.S. 680, 696 (1989) (explaining whether a payment is a
contribution or gift).
70
See Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-8 (2013) (providing there is a gift when “the value of
property transferred by the donor exceeds the value in money or money’s worth of the
consideration given”).
71
Rev. Proc. 2012-41, Treas. Reg. § 601.602, available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irsdrop/RP-12-41.pdf, archived at perma.cc/L688-XSWV.
72
See BRANT J. HELLWIG & ROBERT T. DANFORTH, ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION 75–76
(2011) (treating contributions to corporations as contributions to its members for purposes
of the gift tax exclusion). This is considered a contribution of a future interest and the
annual exclusion is therefore not available. See also Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(h)(1) (providing
an exception to donations to political organizations, but political organizations in that
context likely refer to political organizations under § 527, which are now specifically
exempted from the gift tax).
73
See Ellen P. Aprill, Once and Future Gift Taxation of Transfers to Section 501(c)(4)
Organizations: Current Law, Constitutional Issues, and Policy Considerations, 15 N.Y.U. J.
LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 289, 291 (2012) (discussing the Service’s Exempt Organizations
division’s ignorance when asked whether “[d]onations to 501(c)(4) organizations are
taxable gifts”); Political Advocacy and Taxable Entities, supra note 9, at 70 (discussing the
Service’s position on the gift tax provision as it relates to political organizations); Donald B.
Tobin, The Application of the Gift Tax Provisions in the Internal Revenue Code to § 501(c)(4)
Organizations, ELECTIONLAW@MORITZ (2011), http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/election-law/
65
66
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organization as gifts would have likely led to the conclusion that
contributions to social welfare organizations were subject to gift tax.74
After pressure from Republican Senators, the Service announced that it
was examining the issue and any action to enforce the gift tax would
only be prospective.75 If a gift to social welfare organizations is not
subject to gift tax, then similar logic should apply to gifts to taxable
organizations.
IV. GAMES WE PLAY
With these tax concepts in mind, the new loophole can be exploited.
A taxable organization has two possible avenues for obtaining funds for
its organization without having to include those funds in income for
income tax purposes. First, it can seek very large contributions,
classifying them as contributions to capital. It can either argue that these
are non-shareholder contributions to capital or it can provide some
ownership or other rights to the contributor in exchange for the
contribution. If the contributions are contributions to capital, the taxable
organization will have no income tax liability from the payments.
Alternatively, the organization can argue that the contributions are
gifts. The donor has provided a gift to the organization in the same
manner that donors make contributions to charities, educational
institutions, and other political organizations. As such, the entity will
article/?article=8335, archived at http://perma.cc/7WRD-X5J8 (explaining that the Service
has indicated contributions are subject to gift tax).
74
See supra note 73 and accompanying text (identifying theories of social welfare
organizations being subject to gift tax).
75
See Orrin G. Hatch, Jon Kyl, Pat Roberts, John Cornyn, John Thune & Richard Burr,
Senators to IRS: Questions Raised by Agency’s Recent Actions into Gift Tax Enforcement;
Concern about Political Influence, U.S. SENATE COMMITTEE ON FINANCE (May 18, 2011),
http://www.finance.senate.gov/newsroom/ranking/release/?id=ec29441e-aefd-4192-a62
8-d96966cf4231, archived at http://perma.cc/5HAW-4L6Q (detailing several senators’
request to the Service for names of individuals who made the decision to enforce the
provision, correspondence between the Service’s employees, Treasury, and the White
House on the issue, and any analysis generated by the Service regarding First Amendment
issues related to the collection); Steven T. Miller, Memorandum for Commissioner, Small
Business/Self-Employed Division Commissioner, Tax-exempt and Government Entities Division,
DEP’T. TREAS. (July 7, 2011), http://www.irs.gov/pub/newsroom/guidance_for_irs_sbse_
estate_and_gift_tax_and_tege_exempt_organizations.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/
ZJE6-XPXL (providing guidance for small business and self-employed estate and gift tax);
Letter from Marcus Owens to Emily S. McMahon, Acting Assistant Sec’y, Dept. Treas.
(Aug. 8, 2011), http://big.assets.huffingtonpost.com/McMahonletter.pdf, archived at
http://perma.cc/RH7-7C6Z (criticizing the Service’s lack of guidance concerning gift tax
and charitable organizations); Donald B. Tobin, Is Congress Politicizing the IRS and Its Tax
Enforcement Process?, TAX ANALYSTS (Aug. 22, 2011), http://taxprof.typepad.com/
files/132tn0853.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/ET9A-EVGS (discussing the Service’s
announcement that it is re-examining its policies).
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argue the donations are not income for tax purposes. If these payments
are gifts, there is a risk they would be subject to gift tax. Donors could
then argue that, just like donations to social welfare groups, donations to
taxable entities should not be subject to gift tax.76 Organizations
following this path are organized as taxable entities but would have little
to no tax bill because they would have little to no income. Since these
organizations are not tax-exempt, they would not have any obligation to
file disclosure returns with the Service nor would they be required to file
with the Service seeking recognition. If they were corporations, they
would have to file as a state corporation, but little other disclosure would
be required.77 If the corporation engaged in electioneering
communication or express advocacy it would have to disclose those
expenditures, but it would likely not have to disclose its donors.78
Taxable entities would still be required to file a tax return with the
Service, but those returns would be subject to privacy protections under
section 6103 of the Code. Moreover, these taxable organizations would
be subject to review only if the Service chose to audit the returns.
V. CONCLUSION
This Lecture discusses the possible next frontier for organizations
seeking to avoid donor disclosure. If Congress, the Treasury, or the
Service successfully reforms the current structure to ensure donor
disclosure by tax-exempt groups, IGs may simply reorganize as taxable
entities and seek ways to limit their tax liability. The Service should set
out clear guidance regarding whether contributions I have described
here are contributions to capital, and whether payments could be
considered gifts for gift and income tax purposes. The Service needs to
provide guidance in this area before taxable entities become the next
campaign vehicle of choice. Guidance could be given today in a
nonpolitically charged environment before a particular party or entity is
identified with this loophole. Once politically charged organizations
start using the loophole, guidance will become more difficult. Congress
and the Service can plug this hole before it leaks.

76
I have argued elsewhere that donations to social welfare organizations are subject to
gift tax. The analysis here with regard to taxable entities highlights why gift tax treatment
is appropriate under current law in the social welfare context. Political Advocacy and Taxable
Entities, supra note 9, at 70.
77
While outside the scope of this Lecture, the corporation could likely organize as either
a nonprofit corporation or as a public benefit corporation under state law. An entity could
also organize as a limited liability company and then elect to be taxed as a corporation.
78
See supra note 15 and accompanying text (discussing required disclosure of
expenditures related to electioneering communications).
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